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Fishbein and Middlestadt (1995) argued that evidence for nonbelief-based attitude change 
is primarily artifactual, resulting from inadequate one, belief-based measurement of 
attitudes and beliefs. Thus, all attitude change occurs through this process. In this article, 
we present three arguments in response. First, evidence exists suggestingthat some attitude 
change processes are best conceptualized as relatively nonbelief based. Second, evidence 
is presented of attitudes resulting from relatively nonbelief- and belief-based attitude 
change processes, as assessed by the same measure of beliefs within the same study. Third, 
studies have found substantive and meaningful differences in the attitudes resulting from 
what are posited to be different attitude change processes. Together, these arguments 
provide a strong case for the existence and differential consequences of both belief- and 
nonbelief-based attitude change processes. 
Fishbein and Middlestadt (F & M; 1995) argued that evidence for nonbelief-based 
attitude change is primarily artifactual, resulting from inadequate measurement of 
attitudes and beliefs. Specifically, they argued that the influence of any variable on 
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persuasion is mediated by belief change: When properly measured, a variable will 
influence underlying beliefs about an attitude object, and the underlying beliefs will 
influence the attitude toward that object. This set of relationships is represented in 
Figure 1. F & M argued that Path 1, from the variable (V) to beliefs (B), and Path 
2, from B to attitudes (A), represent the one process by which variables influence 
attitudes. Of critical importance to the F & M discussion is the direct path from the 
V to the final A, Path 3, which represents a nonbelief-based attitude change process. 
F & M argued that evidence supporting this direct influence of a variable on attitudes 
is the result of mismeasurement of the beliefs and attitudes and/or that with proper 
measurement, only Paths 1 and 2, but not Path 3, will emerge as significant. 
In this article, we present three arguments in response to F & M (1995). First, 
evidence exists suggesting that some attitude change processes are best conceptu- 
alized as relatively nonbelief based. Second, evidence is presented of attitudes 
resulting from relatively nonbelief- and belief-based attitude change processes, as 
assessed by the same measure of beliefs within the same study. Third, studies have 
found substantive and meaningful differences in the attitudes resulting from what 
are posited to be different attitude change processes. This evidence of, and conse- 
quences associated with, both nonbelief- and belief-based attitude change processes 
indicate that the extant literature better supports the notion that these differences 
represent two substantive and meaningful theoretical constructs. 
Traditionally, an attitude has been defined as a positive or negative evaluative 
response to an attitude object. This definition underlies the arguments to be 
presented, with the further specification that certain properties often associated with 
attitudes (e.g., resistance to counterpersuasive attacks, ability to guide behavior) 
are not necessary for a response to be defined as an attitude. If all attitudes were 
required to possess these qualities, the concept of "attitude change" could not exist: 
The moment an attitude could be changed, it would no longer be defined as an 
attitude! Further, for purposes of brevity, select studies are cited as evidence of the 
arguments. These studies are cited to illustrate the arguments and are not presented 
as the extant evidence. In fact, the number of studies available to support the 
FIGURE 1 Representation of belief- and nonbelief-based attitude change processes. 
(V) represents the persuasion variable of interest, (B) represents the underlying attitude- 
related beliefs, and (A) represents the attitude. 
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arguments are extensive and are cited elsewhere (e.g., Petty, Priester, & Wegener, 
1994; Petty & Wegener, 1997). 
ARGUMENT 1 
Evidence of Nonbelief-Based Attitude Change Processes 
A number of processes have been found to influence attitudes that are best concep- 
tualized as relatively nonbelief based. That is, these processes appear to directly 
influence attitudes (Path 3, Figure 1). Specifically, attitude change has been found 
to result from at least five relatively nonbelief-based processes; mere umeinforced 
exposure to stimuli (e.g., Zajonc, 1968; see also Bornstein, 1989); priming with 
affective stimuli (e.g., Murphy & Zajonc, 1993); classical conditioning (e.g., Gorn, 
1982; Kim, Allen, & Kardes, 1996; Shimp, Stuart, & Engle, 1991; Staats & Staats, 
1958); arm flexion and arm extension (e.g., Cacioppo, Priester, & Berntson, 1993; 
Priester, Cacioppo, & Petty, 1996); and "facial feedback," or contraction and 
inhibition of facial smiling muscles (e.g., Strack, Martin, & Stepper, 1988). 
Investigators of such phenomena have not posited belief change as the process 
by which attitudes are influenced. Although the precise processes are still under 
investigation (e.g., Kim et al., 1996), the existing literature does suggest that many 
of these attitude change processes can occur under conditions in which belief 
change is improbable. Prior research suggests that, in general, beliefs are most likely 
to be changed as a result of conscious consideration of information (e.g., Fishbein 
& Ajzen, 1975; McGuire, 1960; Wyer, 1970). Thus, beliefs should be less likely 
to change when the attitude change stimulus occurs outside of participants' con- 
scious awareness. Yet many of these processes have been found to influence 
attitudes under just such conditions. As an example, the phenomenon of mere 
exposure is the positive relation between attitudes toward a stimulus and its 
unreinforced repeated exposure. Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc (1980) found that mere 
exposure led to enhanced attitudes even toward stimuli that were presented sub- 
liminally (see also Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; Strack et al., 1988; Wilson, 1979, for 
similar results with other nonbelief-based attitude change processes). Thus, re- 
search has found evidence of attitude change even when belief change is unlikely 
to have occurred. 
A belief-based explanation of these results would suggest that such attitude 
change processes (e.g., mere exposure) are possible when beliefs are more difficult 
to change, but should result in greater attitude change when beliefs are more likely 
to be changed. This explanation would hypothesize that mere exposure is a 
belief-based process and would predict that mere exposure should influence atti- 
tudes more with conscious than nonconscious presentation. 
Contrary to this prediction, however, many of these attitude change processes 
have been found to be more effective in changing attitudes under conditions of 
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nonconscious presentation than under conditions of conscious presentation. For 
example, Bornstein and D'Agostino (1992) found that stimuli presented sublimi- 
nally (for 5ms) produced significantly greater attitude change with repeated expo- 
sure than did stimuli presented supraliminally (for 500ms). This finding replicated 
the conclusions of an extensive meta-analysis of the mere exposure literature 
(Bornstein, 1989). Thus, contrary to the predictions of a belief-based explanation, 
the mere exposure attitude change process appears to be more effective when beliefs 
are less, rather than more, likely to be changed. In short, mere exposure is explained 
best by a relatively nonbelief-based process. In fact, similar results have been found 
with other such processes (e.g., greater attitude change as a result of subliminal 
rather than conscious affective priming, Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; see also Ca- 
cioppo, Marshall-Goodell, Tassinary, & Petty, 1992; Priester et d.,  1996; Shimp 
et al., 1991), suggesting that they are also explained best by relatively nonbelief- 
based processes. 
ARGUMENT 2 
Evidence of Relatively Belief- and Nonbelief-Based 
Attitude Change 
A limitation of the first argument is that these studies seldom attempt to assess the 
beliefs on which the changed attitudes are based (cf. Gmsh, 1976). Thus, although 
unlikely, the possibility remains that these attitude change processes are somehow 
belief based. A second limitation is that, even were a study to indicate attitude 
change unmediated by assessed beliefs, one could always argue that beliefs and/or 
attitudes had been improperly measured. The second argument addresses these two 
limitations. 
Evidence addressing these two limitations would be provided by a study in which 
beliefs as well as attitudes were assessed, the same persuasive information was 
presented, and similarly extreme attitudes resulted from relatively belief- and 
nonbelief-based attitude change processes, albeit under different, specifiable con- 
ditions. Such a study would address the limitations of the first argument in that (a) 
underlying beliefs would be measured and (b) the evidence indicating that attitude 
change was a result of a belief-based process would render the assertion that the 
evidence for nonbelief-based attitude change was due to mismeasurement less 
credible. In fact, several studies have shown attitudes of equal extremity resulting 
from relatively belief- and nonbelief-based processes (see Petty et al., 1994; Petty 
& Wegener, 1997, for reviews). Two studies by Petty, Schumann, Richman, and 
Strathman (1993) illustrate this point. These investigators hypothesized that when 
message recipients were motivated (and able) to think about persuasive informa- 
tion, their mood would influence the nature of the beliefs generated in response to 
the information (Path 1, Figure 1) and the beliefs would lead to attitude change 
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(Path 2, Figure 1). That is, given high motivation to think, persuasion would be the 
result of relatively belief-based attitude change processes. In contrast, when indi- 
viduals were not motivated to think about the persuasive information, mood would 
influence attitudes directly (Path 3, Figure I), but would not influence beliefs (Path 
1, Figure 1). That is, given low motivation to think, persuasion would be the result 
of arelatively nonbelief-based attitude change process. The studies used convergent 
methods to vary positive and neutral mood and motivation to think (need for 
cognition, Cacioppo & Petty, 1982, in Experiment 1 and manipulation of involve- 
ment in Experiment 2). Beliefs were assessed by cognitive responses, a measure of 
idiosyncratic attitude-related beliefs. 
In both studies, positive mood led to greater attitude change than neutral mood, 
regardless of motivation to think. Mediational analyses supported the predictions 
in both studies. When participants were motivated to think about the persuasive 
information, mood influenced the proportion of positive beliefs (Path 1, Figure I), 
and beliefs in turn influenced attitudes (Path 2, Figure 1). There was no direct 
influence of mood on attitudes (Path 3, Figure 1) when motivation to think was 
high. These findings provide evidence for relatively belief-based attitude change 
when motivation to think is high. In contrast, when participants were not motivated 
to think, attitude change was the direct result of participants' mood. Mood influ- 
enced attitudes (i.e., through Path 3, Figure 1) without influencing beliefs (i.e., not 
through Path 1, Figure 1; see also Batra & Stayman, 1990). These findings reveal 
that under theoretically specifiable conditions, attitude change was either the result 
of changes in underlying beliefs (given high motivation to think) or the direct result 
of mood (given low motivation to think). 
This study addresses the limitations of the first argument. First, the beliefs were 
assessed. Second, the moderated result, revealing both belief- and nonbelief-based 
attitude change processes, renders a mismeasurement explanation less tenable. The 
measurement procedures were of sufficient sensitivity to detect belief-based atti- 
tude change processes given high motivation to think and were the same as those 
used to assess beliefs and attitudes when motivation to think was low (viz., when 
mood influenced attitudes directly). Thus, any measurement artifact explanation 
would have to account for why the same measurement procedures can detect 
belief-based attitude change processes under certain conditions and not under other 
conditions. 
ARGUMENT 3 
Substantive Differences in Attitudes Resulting From 
Different Change Processes 
A mismeasurement explanation of the Petty et al. (1993) findings does seem 
unlikely given the moderated findings of the study. However, an artifactual expla- 
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nation is still possible. Rather than using the approach outlined by F & M (1995), 
the Petty et al. studies assessed beliefs by a thought-listing/cognitive response 
procedure. After participants were exposed to the persuasive information and 
completed all attitude measures, they were asked to write down and subsequently 
code the thoughts that occurred to them as they were exposed to the information 
(see Petty, Ostrom, & Brock, 1981). Although the cognitive response approach 
allows participants to express their idiosyncratic responses (i.e., salient attributes 
and outcomes) related to the persuasive information, this approach does not have 
all the properties deemed necessary by F & M (e.g., assessment of belief strength, 
use of bipolar scoring). Thus, one might still attempt to attribute the Petty et al. 
(1993) findings to mismeasurement. However, the artifact explanation would also 
predict that apparent differences in attitude change processes would not result in 
attitudes that differ in their properties, because evidence for different processes is 
hypothesized to be entirely artifactual. Thus, the artifact explanation would predict 
no differences between the attitudes formed under high versus low motivation to 
think. Consequently, a study that reveals substantive and meaningful differences 
in the attitudes resulting from relatively belief- and nonbelief-based attitude change 
processes, along with the first two arguments, would render an artifact explanation 
even more problematic. 
Petty, Cacioppo, and Schumann (1983) provided an example of such a study. 
They explored the relation among motivation to think (as manipulated by involve- 
ment in a manner similar to Petty et al., 1992, Experiment 2), presence of a 
persuasive cue (i.e., celebrity endorser), the resulting attitude change processes, and 
the properties associated with the resulting attitudes. This study found that attitudes 
formed as a result of relatively thoughtful (i.e., belief-based) attitude change 
processes induced by high involvement were associated with greater attitude-be- 
havioral intention correspondence than were attitudes of equal extremity formed as 
a result of relatively inference-based (i.e., nonbelief-based) processes induced by 
low involvement. Specifically, attitudes changed by thoughtful consideration of the 
persuasive information contained in the advertisement (Paths 1 and 2) exhibited a 
higher correlation between attitudes and purchase intentions ( r  = .59) than did 
attitudes changed by less thoughtful processes (Path 3, r = .36). As noted by F & 
M, behavioral intention is determined by an individual's attitude and the subjective 
norms regarding the behavior. Because the participants were randomly assigned to 
the experimental conditions of high and low motivation to think, the subjective 
norms regarding purchase intention should not vary across these conditions. In 
addition, as stated, attitudes resulting from relatively belief-based attitude change 
processes were of equal extremity (i.e., they appeared the same as assessed by 
traditional attitude measures). Thus, the differential correspondence between atti- 
tudes and behavioral intention can only be the result of differences in the properties 
of the attitudes resulting from the drfferent processes. Specifically, the attitudes 
resulting from the relatively thoughtful attitude change process were more influen- 
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tial in forming behavioral intention than were the attitudes resulting from the 
relatively nonthoughtful attitude change process. 
An abundance of studies show conceptually similar findings. In general, atti- 
tudes that are the result of relatively thoughtful (i.e., belief-based) attitude change 
processes are stronger than attitudes that are the result of relatively nonthoughtful 
(i.e., nonbelief-based) attitude change processes (see Petty, Haugtvedt, & Smith, 
1995; Petty et al., 1994; Petty & Wegener, 1997, for reviews). Three specific 
attitude properties have been found to differ as a function of attitude change process. 
Attitudes associated with relatively greater thought exhibit greater (a) persistence 
(e.g., Haugtvedt & Petty, 1992; Lyndon, Zanna, & Ross, 1988; Verplanken, 1991), 
(b) resistance to counterpersuasion attempts (e.g., Haugtvedt & Wegener, 1994; 
McGuire, 1964; Wu & Shafer, 1987), and (c) attitude-behavior correspondence 
(e.g., Cacioppo, Petty, Kao, & Rodriquez, 1986; Leippe & Elkin, 1987; Sivacek & 
Crano, 1982) than do attitudes associated with relatively less thought. That is, 
counter to the artifact explanation prediction, studies have found substantive and 
meaningful differences in the attitudes resulting from different attitude change 
processes. 
These findings are not easily predicted or explained by F & M's conceptualiza- 
tion of all attitude change as belief based, nor do they support F & M's conclusion 
that findings of different processes are artifactual. These findings of substantive 
and meaningful differences in attitude strength as a result of attitude change process 
are indicative instead of meaningful theoretical constructs. 
CONCLUSION 
Conceptual Differences Versus Measurement Artifact 
In this article, we provide three arguments in response to F & M (1995). First, we 
presented evidence of attitude change processes that are difficult to reconcile with 
F & M's position. Second, we presented evidence of attitudes resulting from 
relatively nonbelief- and belief-based attitude change processes, as assessed by the 
same measures of attitudes and beliefs. Third, the different attitude change proc- 
esses (evidence of which F & M would attribute to mismeasurement) were shown 
to result in consistent, predictable, and consequential differences in the properties 
of the resulting attitudes. Together, these arguments provide a strong case for the 
existence and differential consequences of both belief- and nonbelief-based attitude 
change processes. 
The question of the existence and consequences of both relatively belief- and 
nonbelief-based attitude change processes is important for both theoretical and 
applied concerns. Understanding why and under what conditions qualitatively 
different processes guide attitude change better informs us of how individuals cope 
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with and attend to environments rich in information, and it also allows for more 
precise prediction of when attitudes are more likely to show persistence, resistance, 
and guide behavior. This theoretical advance enriches our conceptual under- 
standing of attitudes and persuasion and our understanding of constructs in other 
domains of human judgment and behavior. For example, theories positing that 
different (i.e., relatively belief- and nonbelief-based) processes can lead to similar 
evaluations and judgments have been advanced in the areas of stereotypes (e.g., 
Bodenhausen, 1990; Fiske & Pavelchak, 1986; Gilbert & Hixon, 1991), responses 
to questions (e.g., Krosnick, 199 l), and impression formation (Brewer, 1988; Fiske 
& Neuberg , 1990). 
One implication of current theories and research is that equivalently favorable 
attitudes can be the result of relatively belief- or nonbelief-based attitude change. 
And research reveals that the ability of an attitude to guide and influence behavior 
differs markedly depending on the process by which the attitude is changed. Thus, 
the existence and consequences of both belief- and nonbelief-based attitude change 
processes greatly modify the goals and strategies of persuasion attempts. For 
example, if one is interested in changing AIDS-related behavior, the goal should 
be to engage individuals in thoughtful consideration of the persuasion information 
in an attempt to change AIDS-related attitudes (e.g., attitudes toward safe sex) 
through belief-based processes. That is, to measure the success of any influence- 
oriented campaign, one must understand not only to what extent but also by what 
process attitudes have been changed. 
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